We examine a simple measure of risk-adjusted performance for portfolio managers, which is grounded in prospect theory and therefore reflects loss-aversion. The measure is the ratio of gains to losses, each of which is raised to a fractional power. If gains and losses are calculated relative to a benchmark, then the measure is a nonlinear function of tracking errors; it can also be interpreted as the weighted ratio of the value of a call option to a put option, with the benchmark as the exercise price. When applying the loss-aversion-performance (LAP) measure to closed-end funds, we find that it gives rankings which are different from those of conventional measures (such as the Sharpe ratio, Jensen's alpha and the Higher Moment measure), and gives the expected signs for the odd and even moments of tracking errors. However, LAP is not more closely related to fund discounts than are the conventional performance measures, so we have not found evidence that loss-aversion attracts investors to particular funds.
Introduction
Measures of portfolio performance, which take account both of risk and return, have evolved over the years in parallel with asset pricing theory. The Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966) comes from portfolio theory and uses the variance of returns as its risk, while Treynor (1965) , Treynor and Mazuy (1966) , and Jensen (1968 Jensen ( , 1969 use the CAPM beta as their measure of risk. Later measures are based on the APT (for example, Connor and Korajczyk, 1986 and Lehmann and Modest, 1987) , the positive period weighting measure (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) , the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (Glosten and Jagannathan, 1994) , the law of one price and/or no arbitrage (Chen and Knez, 1996) , and the higher moments of the distribution (Hwang and Satchell, 1998) . Most of these measures are based upon a representative investor who maximises expected utility.
However, conventional expected utility theory has been criticised for being inconsistent with the observed behaviour of investors. In particular, investors weight losses more heavily than equivalent gains and they do not take account of their final wealth in such an evaluation. In other words, there is "loss aversion". This led Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to develop prospect theory, according to which investors maximise the weighted sum of a value function, where the 'value function' is calculated in terms of gains or losses rather than final wealth and the 'weights' are subjective rather than objective. If gains and losses are measured relative to expectations rather than what happened in the recent past, then loss-aversion has been renamed "disappointment aversion" by Gul (1991) and there are applications of this by Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2002) and Fielding and Stracca (2003) , among others.
In this study we examine a new measure of performance which is consistent with the loss-aversion of Kahneman and Tversky. The measure, which we denote as lossaversion performance (LAP), is simply the ratio of gains to losses, both of which are raised to fractional powers. In other words, it measures in a particular way the 'upside' reward relative to the 'downside' loss. When the reference point to distinguish gains from losses is the benchmark portfolio, then gains and losses are 'tracking errors' and the LAP measure becomes the ratio of positive tracking errors to negative tracking errors, each raised to a power. Under the special case that the power terms are both set to unity, our measure can be interpreted as the ratio of a call option to a put option, and is the same as the Omega performance measure of Keating and Shadwick (2002) . This measure has also been investigated in a technical paper by Darsino and Satchell (2003) .
The measurement of gains and losses is critical in implementing prospect theory. An interesting feature of investors is that they tend to take greater risks when they have experienced recent gains --the "house-money effect" (see, for example, Johnson, 1990, Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001) . Because of the house-money effect, LA performance should be a function of previous gains and losses as well as current gains and losses. For example, the poor performance of a fund in this period can be compensated to some extent by good performance in a previous period, or be regarded as remaining poor if there have been previous losses. Two of our three measures of loss-aversion performance allow for the house-money effect, as they incorporate lagged performance.
Using 42 UK closed-end funds, we first show some statistical properties of the LA performance measure (in three particular specifications) as compared with the Sharpe (1966) ratio, Jensen's (1968) alpha, and the higher moment (HM) measure of Hwang and Satchell (1998) . The new loss-aversion performance measures give rankings which are different from those of conventional measures, but we do not find any significant differences between the three LA variants and conclude that the housemoney effect contributes little to performance evaluation. Nevetheless, our results support loss-aversion measures of performance, in the sense that these measures have properties such as a positive relationship with funds' tracking errors and a negative relationship with their kurtosis. Other measures, such as Jensen's alpha and the HM, do not have these properties.
We also examine whether measures of performance can explain the discount on closed-end funds. If a performance measure is capturing what investors want, then it might be expected that the discount would be smaller for funds which "perform" well by that measure. We find that there is no simple relationship between discounts and any of the performance measures (traditional or otherwise), so investor "sentiment" is not adequately captured in this way --at least in our particular sample of 42 funds.
The paper is written as follows. In the next section we develop the theory underlying loss-aversion performance. In section 3 we compare the behaviour of LA performance with traditional measures, using a sample of 42 closed-end investment funds for 108 months. In section 4 we consider whether LA performance is more closely related to investor sentiment than traditional measures, based on the behaviour of closed-end-fund discounts. Section 5 draws together the conclusions and implications of the paper.
Performance Measure with Loss Aversion Utility

Loss Aversion Utility
According to prospect theory, decisions are based upon gains and losses rather than upon the final wealth level (which is the key in conventional expected utility theory).
Let W t be the wealth of an investor at time t and let B t be some appropriate benchmark wealth at time t relative to which an investor measures gains and losses. Gains are then measured as X t , with X t =W t −B t , and loss-aversion utility is defined as
where the parameters v 1 , v 2 and λ are assumed positive. The two terms in (1) are gains raised to the power v 1 , and losses raised to the power v 2 multiplied by a factor λ.
Equation (1) can represent an investor who is risk-averse or risk-loving in gains, and separately risk-averse or risk-loving in losses, depending on the choice of the parameters, v 1 and v 2 . The investor is risk-averse with respect to gains if the second derivative of the first term in Equation (1) is negative (i.e.,
while she is risk-loving with respect to losses if the second derivative of the second term in Equation (1) is positive (i.e.,
the investor is risk-neutral with respect to gain or losses, but this case is not supported by prospect theory. Figure 1 demonstrates how loss-aversion utility depends on gains and losses for the case originally suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , where there is risk-aversion in gains (v 1 <1) and risk-seeking in losses (v 2 <1). The appropriate values for the parameters --λ , v 1 and v 2 --are not self-evident. With respect to λ, it has to be greater than 1 in order to generate the loss-aversion kink in the lower part of the value-function of Figure 1 . Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) , use λ = 2.25, while Ang, Bekeart, and Liu (2002) use a range of λ values which exceed unity. Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) also present some evidence that λ > 1. With respect to v 1 and v 2 , they need to be less than unity in order to generate risk-aversion in both the gain and loss domains. Hwang and Satchell (2003) use theoretical arguments to suggest that the curvature parameter for the losses (v 2 ) should be larger than that for the gains (v 1 ), although the difference between the two need not be large.
Loss Aversion Utility with 'House-Money' Effect
There have been two important developments since the introduction of prospect theory in 1979 which are relevant to performance measurement. The first is that convexity (risk seeking) over losses is not generally supported; it is observed only when decision makers are asked to choose among risky prospects that involve losses and no possible gains. For example, an investor is asked to choose between a 20% loss which is riskless and a gamble with equal probability of a loss of a loss of 0% or a loss of 50%. By contrast , Thaler and Johnson (1990) find evidence that decision makers become more risk averse after losses. 1 Levy and Levy (2002) , using stochastic dominance theory and experiments, also conclude that investors are not generally risk-loving but risk-averse over losses. In addition, Burnes and Neilson (2002) suggest that loss-aversion utility cannot simultaneously explain gambles on unlike gains and the Allais (1952) paradox. We therefore think that investors are likely to be risk-averse over both the loss and gain domains and our standard formulation for loss-aversion utility, which we call V S , will reflect this.
The second development is that decision-makers who have experienced prior gains may exhibit less pain for losses, which is known as the 'house-money' effect. Thus the value of λ may depend on recent outcomes and this is the approach taken by Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) in their study of the equity risk-premium. We propose two variants of our basic measure of loss-aversion utility which allow for the house-money effect. For the first variant, we follow Barberis, Huang and Santos and make the loss-aversion coefficient depend on the previous gains and losses:
where 
where
There is no longer a sharp kink at the zero gain/loss point. This is not as radical as it appears, because the "knife-edge" distinction between gains and losses may be rather artificial. For example, in financial markets we have several different choices of market indices for the benchmark. Although these are highly correlated, some small differences are inevitable and thus a small loss calculated with one benchmark may be a small gain with another benchmark. The exponential weight in the utility function is consistent with Levy and Levy (2002) and satisfies the need for concavity around zero, which Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) argue is far more important than the two curvature parameters. We are going to call this exponentially-weighted variant the V EW function. A comparison of the shapes of the V H and V EW is made in the Appendix (which includes Figure 2 ). Gains or losses from investing in a portfolio can be expressed relative to the benchmark as:
Loss Aversion Risk Measures
where r pt is the portfolio return at time t. The loss-aversion utility function in (1) can also be re-written using the benchmark as: 
and the expectation is calculated with a subjective, rather than an objective, probability density function.
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Viewed in this way, the expected LA utility in equation (5) 
λ is the trade-off between the expected return and its variance.
The second component of LA ulitility in equation (5)is also a special case of the risk measure suggested by Fishburn (1977) 
which includes variance and semi-variance as special cases (in addition to standard deviation and semi-standard deviation). Using the objective probability density function, the second component of (5) may be written as
The difference between Fishburn's measure and our loss-aversion risk measure is that we allow v 2 to be any positive real number. Note that v 2 is chosen to be 0.88 by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and Ang, Bekeart, and Liu (2000) , whereas Hwang and Satchell (2003) suggest v 2 =0.95. If we choose v 2 =1, as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995) , our loss-aversion risk measure becomes semi-standard-deviation with respect to the target rate of return r b .
Loss Aversion Performance Measures
We propose a performance measure which is equivalent to the Sharpe (1966) ratio but applied to a world where there is loss-aversion. The Sharpe Ratio (SR) is the reward per unit of total variability:
where σ p is the standard deviation of portfolio returns.
Since the second component in the expected loss aversion utility in equation (5) is equivalent to a risk measure, a simple loss aversion performance measure, LAP S , equivalent to the Share ratio is
This is a measure which represents the reward per unit of loss-aversion risk. Note that both numerator and denominator are unconditional expected gains and losses, since conditional expected gains and losses are multiplied by their probabilities. The size of the coefficient λ is not required, just as MV λ is not required for the Sharpe ratio, because it is a constant.
An important special case arises when the return on a benchmark portfolio is used, then r p −r b is tracking error, which we can define as TE≡r p −r b . 4 The simple loss aversion performance becomes:
This loss-aversion performance measure differs from the Sharpe ratio (SR) in three particular ways. First, the LAP S is based on upside gains relative to downside losses, so it allows for asymmetry in the return distribution. Second, the measure concentrates on returns relative to a benchmark, whereas the Sharpe ratio is usually computed relative to the risk-free rate (although Sharpe, 1966 , does use a benchmark portfolio). Third, the LAP S reflects different preferences for gains and losses, by allowing v 1 and v 2 to be unequal and different from one.
as well as p=prob(TE>0) requires an assumption on the probability density function (pdf) of tracking errors (TEs).
Unfortunately the properties of TEs are not known, and even if r p and r b are normal this does not imply that the TEs will be normal. In the empirical tests we use nonparametric methods (i.e. empirical samples), in order to avoid complicated mathematical explanations.
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Figure 3 demonstrates the simplicity of the LAP S in a way similar to that used by Keating and Shadwick (2002) for their Omega measure. In the diagram, the benchmark return is set at B. Note that for an absolute-return fund (such as a hedge fund) this might be set at, say, 5% per annum rather than as the return on an index.
The LAP S is equal to the probability of gains, p, times the expected (fractionally powered) gains of X G , divided by the probability of losses, 1-p, times the expected (fractionally powered) losses of X L . When v 1 =v 2 =1, the LAP S is equivalent to Keating and Shadwick's Omega. In this specific case, note how pX G is also equal in value to an outperformance call (relative to the benchmark, exercise price, B) and (1-p)X L is equal in value to an underperformance put at the same exercise price. If the distribution of excess returns were normal, then the values of these options could be easily computed with the Black/Scholes formula.
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5 We may assume a specific pdf for the calculation of the S LAP . See Hwang and Satchell (2003) for the detailed explanation on the two cases; normal and mixed Gamma distributions. The mixed Gamma distribution is quite useful since it allows asymmetry and fat tails, while normality does not. In addition, the mixed Gamma distribution provides a nice analytical result for the S LAP . We find that the S LAP calculated with the non-parametric values of ]
are very close to those with the mixed Gamma distribution. The results with the assumption of the pdfs can be obtained from authors. 6 Given the ouperformance character of these options, there are two stochastic variables to take into account -the current portfolio and the benchmark portfolio. Consequently, a model which allows for this becomes necessary, such as that of Margrabe (1978) .
Figure 3 How to Calculate LAP
Returns
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When the house-money effect is taken into account, the loss-aversion coefficient t λ is conditional on the previous performance and the revised performance measure is . , ) 1 (
Likewise, the performance measure with exponential weights is
An interesting question about these performance measures with the house-money effect is how to interpret them. When there are losses in the previous period
), the loss aversion coefficient t λ becomes larger and thus LAP H becomes smaller than the simpler LAP S of (10): previous losses of a fund affect its current evaluation in a negative way. This is consistent with the argument that a loss after a prior loss results in severe pain. On the other hand, previous gains can affect currentperiod evaluation in a favourable way. The measures in (11) and (12) allow us to consider previous years' performance as well as current performance in evaluating a fund.
Empirical Tests
Traditional Performance Measures
In the empirical part of the study we originally started with five different performance measures to compare with the three loss-aversion measures. They were the Sharpe (1966) ratio, Jensen's (1968) alpha, the Treynor and Mazuy (TM) (1966) measure, the higher moment (HM) measure of Hwang and Satchell (1998) , and the positive period weighting (PPW) measure of Grinblatt and Titman (1989) . However, we found that Jensen's alpha, TM and PPW provided virtually identical results, suggesting that timing ability does not exist in our sample. 7 Therefore we will compare the three LAP measures only with the Sharpe ratio, Jensen's alpha and the HM measure.
We need to define these other performance measures precisely.
1) The Sharpe Ratio (SR) is simply the reward per unit of variability and has already been defined in (8). We could use tracking errors to calculate the Sharpe ratio, but using tracking errors can cause a serious problem when we rank funds. 8 This is because, after transactions costs, the expected tracking error is less than zero, so the performance measure becomes negative. 2) Jensen's alpha, α p J , is that part of the performance of a portfolio which is not explained by its CAPM beta:
and r p represents the portfolio's return, r f is the risk-free rate, r m is the market (benchmark) return, β p denotes the systematic risk of the portfolio.
3) The higher moment (HM) measure of Hwang and Satchell (1998) , which is based on the three-moment CAPM is ) (
where 8 The Sharpe ratio is known as the information ratio when measured as outperformance, see Gupta, Prajobi and Stubbs (1999) . 9 If we apply the-higher-the-better rule for the Sharpe ratio to select a better performing fund, we rank a fund whose average value and standard deviation of tracking errors are -0.1% and 2% respectively (the Sharpe ratio is -0.05) higher than a fund whose average value and standard deviation of tracking error are -0.1% and 1% respectively (the Sharpe ratio is -0.1). However, because of the first fund's high volatility, it has higher probability of far negative tracking errors, and for any risk averse investor this fund is not preferred to the second one. Thus in this case we need to apply the opposite rule; the smaller, the better. However, for a given standard deviation, a fund which has a smaller negative average tracking error is preferred to a fund which has a larger negative negative average tracking error, where the-higher-the-better rule applies. In general when average tracking errors of funds are negative, we can not use the Sharpe ratio to rank those funds.
Note that γ m and θ m are the skewness and kurtosis of the market returns, and β p and γ p are beta and coskewness, respectively. If the market returns are normal or investors' utility is governed by mean and variance only, then ψ 1 = β p and ψ 2 =0 and thus HM p α is equivalent to Jensen's Alpha.
Data
In order to make an empirical comparison of the LAP measures with the three traditional measures, we select two groups of UK closed-end funds; one group has a benchmark of the FTSE All-share index, and the other group has a benchmark of the FTSE SmallCap index. By using two groups, we are able to investigate the properties of the performance measures in different markets and also to cross-compare closed- leading to significant non-normality according to the Jarque-Bera statistics. In particular, the SmallCap NAV returns are more leptokurtic than those of the All-share group. The non-normality suggests that performance-measures based on mean and variance may not capture downside-risk satisfactorily. Another pattern in Table 1 is the higher autocorrelation coefficients for returns of funds in the SmallCap group, which may be due to less frequent trading.
The right-hand side of Table 1 reports the statistical properties of the tracking errors (TEs). For the AllShare group most of these tracking errors have means which are close to zero, as expected, but for the SmallCap group 20 of the 23 means are positive.
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S k e w n e s s K u r to s is o n t h l y l o g -r e t u r n s fr o m M a y 1 9 9 3 t o A p r i l 2 0 0 2 i s u s e d to c a l c u la t e t h e s t a t i s t i c s i n t h e t a b l e . T r a c k i n g e r r o r s a r e c a l c u l a t e d b y t a k i n g a p p r o p r i a t e b e n c h m a r k p o r t fo l i o lo g -r e t u r n s fr o m i n v e s tm e n t tr u s t lo g -r e t u r n s . T h e s t a r s i n t h e n o r m a li t y t e s t r e p r e s e n t s s i g n i fi c a n c e a t 5 % l e v e l. B e n c h m a r k P o r tfo l i o a n d I n v e s tm e n t T r u s t s B e n c h m a r k P o r tfo l i o a n d I n v e s tm e n t T r u s t s A u to c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h L a g 1 R a n k C o r r e la tio n s b e tw e e n N A V lo gr e t u r n s a n d T r a c k i n g E r r o r s R a n k C o r r e la tio n s b e tw e e n N A V lo gr e t u r n s a n d T r a c k i n g E r r o r s The results in Table 1 suggest that the distributions of TEs are different from those of NAV returns, but difficult to summarise. Their main feature is that, on the whole, they show less skewness and kurtosis than raw returns. Because of the non-normality for almost all distributions, the simple correlation may not be an appropriate tool to analyse relationships. For this reason we prefer to use rank order correlations. The rank correlation coefficients between NAV returns and TEs (penultimate column of Table 1 ) are positive and significant, but the levels are quite varied (ranging from -0.131 to +0.824). More than two thirds of the coefficients are less than 0.5. This suggests that performance based on tracking errors is likely to be quite different from that based on NAV returns.
Finally, the last column of Table 1 shows that during the nine years, 39 of the 42 funds traded on average at discounts of 10% or more to their NAVs.
Cross-sectional Properties of Loss Aversion Performance Measures
We calculate the LAP S and the three other performance measures over the 108 monthly returns and the results are given in During the sample period, all but one of the Sharpe ratios are positive, whereas
Jensen's alpha and the HM measure, which are relative measures to the benchmark return, are close to zero. We rank the closed-end funds with the three conventional measures within each group (denoted by 'WG' in the table), and find that these three measures behave similarly but are not same. The columns denoted by 'AG' in the table reports ranks among all 42 closed-end funds, which show a very similar pattern to those calculated within group.
The results on the LAP S are reported in the last column of Table 2 . There are nontrivial differences of the LAP S from the three conventional performance measures.
For example the SmallCap, Candover, Northern Investors, and Pantheon Intl. funds are ranked lower with the LAP S than with the conventional measures, which is because they are relatively less positively skewed in tracking errors than in the NAV log-returns. On the other hand, funds such as Perpetual UK, whose tracking errors are relatively more positively skewed and less leptokurtic, are ranked higher with the LAP S than with the conventional measures. This result shows that the LAP S is more sensitive to higher moments than the others, expecially as compared with the HM measure.
Time Varying Properties of Loss Aversion Performance Measures
In this subsection, we examine if the ranks between the portfolios are relatively stable or if they change over time as market conditions change. This could be important, since portfolio performance is evaluated periodically and it is interesting to see if a specific fund performs consistently well over time. If we find that performance does persist (as found by Carhart (1997) for example, using an extended version of Jensen's alpha based on the Fama/French model plus momentum), then we could potentially construct a hedge portfolio (portfolio of portfolios) to obtain excess riskadjusted returns.
We use twelve individual monthly observations to produce annual measures for performance for the 42 funds over all six performance measures (three conventional measures and three loss-aversion measures). Using this approach, we obtain a time- distribution of returns, but it is apparent from the table that asymmetry is only of second-order importance in the persistence of fund rankings over time. The performance measures are calculated annually using 12 monthly returns. Rank cross-correlations between measures are then calculated each year using all 42 investment trusts, and then these correlation coefficients have been averaged over the 9 year period. All estimated rank correlation coefficients are significant at 5% level. Table 3 , the performances of investment trusts are not persistent for any of the measures which we have tested.
Another pattern in Figure 4 is that funds do not differ much with respect to Jensen's alpha and the HM measure in the early 1990s, but there is a much wider dispersion of performance according to these measures in the period after 1997. This indicates that TE during a sample period. This could become a serious problem when data frequency is low and the number of observations is small. Even if we could avoid these two extreme cases, the performance measures may be highly volatile for some cases, as we find in our study.
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From an investor's viewpoint, "good performance" is related positively to the mean and skewness and negatively related to the variance and kurtosis. An easy way to remember this is to note that the correlation of performance with first and third (odd) moments of the distribution (mean and skewness) should be positive and with the second and fourth (even) moments of the distribution (variance and kurtosis) should be negative. In Table 4 we report rank correlations between performance measures and these moments of the distribution, both for NAV returns and for tracking errors.
Starting with the NAV performance in panel A, note that we only give results for the three traditional measures (Sharpe, Jensen, HM) The results in Table 4 
The Closed-End-Fund Puzzle and Performance Measures
The main puzzle related to closed-end funds is that they trade at a discount to their net-asset values. This has already been noted for our sample in the final column of Table 1 . The puzzle has been investigated by many authors, with reasons suggested to be tax liabilities, illiquid assets, management fees, performance, agency problems, tax inefficiency, and market segmentation. 14 The failure of these explanations, which are based on efficient markets and rationality, has led to a behavioural explanation, that the discount reflects the (irrational) sentiment of investors which is not constrained because of the difficulties of performing arbitrage.
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One way to consider the discount is that it is equal to one minus the familiar marketto-book ratio. If investors are happy with a fund's performance, they raise the marketto-book ratio and, for a closed-end fund, this is reflected in a smaller discount. The relevance of this to the present study is that "performance is in the eye of the beholder". If one performance measure is more reflective of investor preferences than another, then funds which perform well according to this measure should also have smaller discounts. That is the hypothesis which we are going to test. Figure 5A plots the average discounts of all UK closed-end funds over our sample period, together with the average discounts for the two groups (AllShare and SmallCap). There is an upward trend in the discount over the period, with the SmallCap discounts always larger than those for the AllShare group. This difference in discounts could be due to the greater replication-risk for the portfolios (of small shares) held by the SmallCap group.
The results on the relationship between performance measures and discounts are given in Table 5 . We first give in panel A the cross-sectional rank correlation coefficients between the discounts of the 42 closed-end funds and the first four moments of returns (i.e., mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis). This is done both for Few of the correlations are significant at the 5% level. We would expect that the discounts would be smaller for funds which have higher NAV returns and this is supported by the negative values in the first row which are, however, not significant. (i) In this paper we have developed three loss-aversion measures of portfolio performance (LAP) which are consistent with prospect theory. The simplest of these measures is closely-related to the Omega measure of Keating and Shadwick (2002) . The other two take account of the housemoney effect, which results in more risk-taking by investors if they have had recent successes. These loss-aversion-performance measures have great intuitive appeal, since they just compare weighted expected gains relative to weighted expected losses. They can also be interpreted as the value of an upside call option relative to a downside put option, with the benchmark return as the exercise price.
(ii) The choice among the three loss-aversion measures of performance does not seem to be important, as they behave very similarly over the period of 3/93 to 4/02 for the 42 closed-end funds in our sample. Incorporating the house-money effect is not important in this sample. if there is loss-aversion. With respect to the second question, we think that loss-aversion is important, but there is no evidence from the behaviour of discounts on closed-end funds to suggest that investors bid-up the prices of funds which perform well by any measure. Either our sample is too small, or loss-aversion does not matter, or we do not have an ideal measure of loss-aversion performance. Further research is needed to distinguish among these alternatives.
(iv) In sum, it is possible to estimate loss-aversion performance for funds and the measures are intuitively appealing. However, we have not yet been able to show that such performance is recognised by investors.
, we require -10< t ρ <10. We do not require the risk averse or decreasing absolute risk averse for the loss averse utility. 
